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Abstract
We establish the existence of subgame perfect equilibria in general menu
games, known to be sufficient to analyze common agency problems. Our main
result states that every menu game satisfying enough continuity properties has a
subgame perfect equilibrium. Despite the continuity assumptions that we make,
discontinuities naturally arise due to the absence, in general, of continuous
optimal choices for the agent. Our approach, then, is based on (and generalizes)
the existence theorem of Simon and Zame (1990) designed for discontinuous
games.
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1 Introduction
In many important examples in multi-contracting mechanism design, several prin-
cipals (attempt to) contract with a common agent to influence her choice. Such a
common agency model has been the focus of much of the recent research in incentive
theory.1
In the common agency model, principals offer a menu of contracts to the agent,
who chooses one contract from those being offered. Although one could imagine more
general communication channels between the principals and the agent, Martimort and
Stole (2002), Page and Monteiro (2003), Peters (2001) and Peters (2003) have shown
that such a procedure of offering menus of contracts is enough to characterize the set
of equilibrium allocations. In fact, as Martimort (2006) points out, “what matters
per se is not the kind of communication that a principal uses with his agent but the
set of options that this principal makes available to the agent.” This result, known as
the delegation principle, implies that the common agency problem can be analyzed
through a menu game.
However, in order for the delegation principle to be meaningful, an equilibrium
must exist. In this paper, we present a solution to this problem by establishing a
general existence theorem for menu games.
A menu game is defined as follows.2 First, the agent’s type is drawn from a
commonly known distribution. Then, the principals simultaneously choose a menu of
contracts (defined as a closed subset of a compact contract space) without observing
the agent’s type. Finally, the agent chooses one contract (or one contract of each
principal), knowing her type and the menus offered by the principals.
The subgame perfect equilibria of a menu game can be easily described by noting
that a strategy for the agent induces a normal-form game between the principals.3 In
1See Martimort (2006) for a survey.
2Our formalization is based on Page and Monteiro (2003).
3Although researchers in this field typically focus on perfect Bayesian equilibrium, we note that
the set of subgame perfect equilibria of a menu game coincides with the set of its perfect Bayesian
equilibria.
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fact, this is a game where each principal has the set of all possible menus as his own
pure strategy set and his payoff is determined by the choice of all principals together
with the agent’s strategy. Thus, a subgame perfect equilibrium consists of an optimal
strategy for the agent and a Nash equilibrium for the normal-form game induced by
such strategy.
The problem of existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium would then be trivial
if there were a continuous (in the principals’ actions) optimal strategy for the agent.
Indeed, the normal-form game induced by such strategy would be continuous and
standard existence theorems would apply. The difficulty with the existence of equi-
librium is that, in general, no optimal strategy for the agent is continuous even if
the agent has a continuous utility function, a compact action space and a continuous
choice correspondence.
Nevertheless, in a sufficiently continuous menu game (e.g., a menu game with
continuous payoff functions for the principals and the agent, as well as with compact
choice sets and a continuous choice correspondence for the agent) discontinuities can
only arise as a result of a discontinuous strategy for the agent. However, such discon-
tinuities create no problem for the existence of equilibrium. Indeed, it follows from
the above description of a subgame perfect equilibrium that we can regard the family
of normal-form games induced by the agent’s strategies as a game with an endogenous
sharing rule as in Simon and Zame (1990) and, therefore, use their existence theorem
to establish the existence of subgame perfect equilibria in menu games. In fact, a
vector of menus defines a subset of payoffs for the principals, each of which corre-
sponds to a particular strategy of the agent. This clearly defines a correspondence
from principals’ strategies into payoffs as required for a game with an endogenous
sharing rule.
In order to use Simon and Zame’s theorem in our setting, we need to generalize
it to allow the payoff correspondence to depend, in a measurable way, on the agent’s
type. Using an approach similar to that of Simon and Zame (1990), we show that any
such generalized game with endogenous sharing rules has a solution. This extension is
non trivial because the agent’s type space is not assumed to be compact, but merely
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complete and separable and the payoff correspondence is not assumed to be jointly
upper hemi-continuous, but only upper hemi-continuous in the principals’ choices and
jointly measurable.
Once the above generalization is accomplished, we can easily obtain a subgame
perfect equilibrium from a solution. In fact, the Borel implicit function lemma of
Furukawa (1972) shows that when the payoff correspondence is the composition of
players’ payoff functions with some correspondence (interpreted as the optimal choice
correspondence of players whose behavior is not explicitly modeled), then every mea-
surable selection from the payoff correspondence can be obtained as the composition
of players’ payoff function and a measurable selection of this other correspondence.
Combining our generalization with this result, we show that every menu game satis-
fying enough continuity properties has a subgame perfect equilibrium.
Independently, Monteiro and Page (2008b) have shown that the common agency
game can be reduced to a game with an endogenous sharing rule, to which the exis-
tence theorem of Simon and Zame (1990) can be applied. They then show that the
agent’s equilibrium strategy can always be chosen to have a support no larger than
then the number of principals plus one and, when the agent’s type space is nonatomic,
that it can be taken to be a pure strategy.
The existence of equilibrium in menu games has also been addressed by Page and
Monteiro (2003) and Monteiro and Page (2008a). The main difference between our
approach and the approach taken in these papers arises because they fix exogenously
a tie-breaking rule for the agent (to be used when she is indifferent between sev-
eral contracts) and then they establish simultaneously the existence of an optimal
strategy for the agent satisfying the tie-breaking rule and equilibrium strategies for
the principals. In contrast, we proceed by determining simultaneously the equilib-
rium strategies for the principals and for the agent without fixing exogenously any
tie-breaking rule.
As Simon and Zame (1990) have pointed out, endogenizing the tie-breaking rule
simplifies the existence problem considerably. Due to this simplification, our existence
result enables us to dispense with several of the assumptions made in Monteiro and
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Page (2008a), obtaining as a result a richer economic model that allows for: (1) a
more general contract space, allowing, in particular, for non-exclusive contracts, (2)
more general payoff functions for the principals that, in particular, can depend on the
menu of contracts being offered and (3) more general utility functions for the agent.
Furthermore, at a technical level, our result dispenses with the equicontinuity
assumption on the agent’s utility function used by Monteiro and Page (2008a). How-
ever, in contrast with their result, ours requires continuous payoff functions for the
principals whereas the existence result of Monteiro and Page (2008a) allows for upper
semi-continuous payoff functions that are quasi-linear.
Our existence result can also be used to establish the existence of equilibria in
several common agency problems considered in the literature under general assump-
tions. This is explicitly done for the retail market model of Martimort and Stole
(2003) and the lobby problem of Martimort and Semenov (2006).
In summary, our contributions are: (1) to show that the approach of Simon and
Zame (1990) is quite appropriate to address the existence of equilibrium in common
agency games, (2) to generalize the main result of Simon and Zame (1990), and (3)
to obtain a general existence result for common agency games.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2. In Section
3, we provide the generalization of Simon and Zame’s Theorem, establish our existence
result and present two applications of our main result. Section 4 concludes. The proof
of some results are in the Appendix.
2 Menu Games
Consider a game with m principals who can offer contracts to a single agent. The set
of contracts that principal i can offer is denoted by Ki and we assume that:
Assumption 1 Ki is a compact metric space.
Each principal offers a menu of contracts to the agent. A menu of contracts for
principal i ∈ I = {1, . . . ,m} is just a nonempty closed subset Ci of Ki.
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In Martimort and Stole (2002) for example, the set of contracts that a principal
can offer equals the set of probability measures over the allocations controlled by
him. Under the assumption that the set of these allocations is finite, it follows that
each principal’s contract space is compact. They allow each principal i to offer a
mechanism to the agent, consisting of a message space Mi and an outcome function
gi :Mi → Ki. IfMi is compact and gi is continuous, then the menu gi(Mi) induced
by (Mi, gi) is a closed subset of Ki. Thus, in this setting, assuming that menus
are closed subsets of Ki amounts to assuming that principals use mechanisms with
compact message spaces and continuous outcome functions.
Let Pi be the collection of all nonempty, closed subsets of Ki. It is well known
that Pi is a compact metric space when endowed with the Hausdorff metric. Let
P = P1 × · · · × Pm and C = (C1, . . . , Cm) denote a profile of menus.
Let K denote the pure action space of the agent and k denote a generic element
of K. We assume that:
Assumption 2 K is a compact metric space.
There are two particular cases for K in which we are interested. One, considered
in Page and Monteiro (2003), is KPM = {(i, f) ∈ I × ∪mi=1Ki : f ∈ Ki}, where
I = {1, . . . ,m}. Here, the agent chooses the principal with whom she wishes to
contract and chooses one contract from this principal. Implicitly, the assumption is
that contracts are exclusive.
A second particular case, considered in Martimort and Stole (2002), is KMS =
K1× · · · ×Km. In this case, contracts are not exclusive, and so the agent can choose
a contract from each principal.
These two cases can be combined in a hybrid model in which the agent chooses
an exclusive principal within several sub-groups of principals. For example, the agent
may have to choose one exclusive electricity company out of two such companies but
chooses to contract with all cell phone companies. Formally, the hybrid model is
defined by a partition {In}Nn=1 of I and by KH =
∏N
n=1{(i, f) ∈ In × ∪i∈InKi : f ∈
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Ki}.4 It is clear that KPM , KMS and KH are compact.
The agent’s payoff depends on her type. The set of agent’s types is denoted by T
and we assume that:
Assumption 3 T is a Polish space, i.e., T is a complete separable metric space.
We endow T with its Borel σ – algebra and let µ describe the probability measure on
the set of types.5 The agent’s utility function is v : T ×K→ R and we assume:
Assumption 4 v is a Carathe´odory function.6
The agent’s problem is as follows. Knowing t ∈ T and given a menu profile C
offered by the principals, she is permitted to randomize over her actions by choosing
a Borel probability measure on K, i.e., a behavioral strategy. We let ∆(K) denote
the space of all such probability measures. The set of available behavioral strategies
is described by a nonempty compact convex set ϕ(t, C) ⊆ ∆(K). Furthermore, we
assume that:
Assumption 5 The correspondence ϕ : T × P ⇒ ∆(K) is continuous.
The idea behind the constraint correspondence ϕ is that the agent can choose only
from among the contracts being offered, i.e., she can only choose a contract fi ∈ Ci
from principal i. Therefore, we have three possible specifications for ϕ corresponding
to the above particular cases for K:
ϕPM(t, C) = {λ ∈ ∆(KPM) : λ(∪mi=1({i} × Ci)) = 1} (1)
in the exclusivity case,
ϕMS(t, C) = {λ ∈ ∆(KMS) : λ(C) = 1} (2)
4In all the above models, we can let some f ∈ Ki denote no contracting, following Page and
Monteiro (2003).
5Throughout the paper, we endow all metric spaces we consider with their Borel σ – algebra.
Therefore, we abbreviate Borel-measurable by measurable.
6If (S,Σ) is a measurable space, X and Y are topological spaces and f : S × X → Y is a
function, then f is a Carathe´odory function if it is measurable in s and continuous in x. Note that
a Carathe´odory function is jointly measurable (see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Lemma 4.50, p.
151)).
7
in the non-exclusivity case and
ϕH(t, C) =
{
λ ∈ ∆(KH) : λ
(
N∏
n=1
(∪i∈In({i} × Ci))
)
= 1
}
(3)
in the hybrid case. Lemma 5 in Appendix shows that ϕPM , ϕMP and ϕH are contin-
uous with nonempty, convex and compact values.
Hence, given t ∈ T and C ∈ P , the agent’s problem is
max
λ∈ϕ(t,C)
∫
K
v(t, k)dλ(k). (4)
Let Λ : T × P ⇒ ∆(K) denote the correspondence of optimal choices. A strategy
for the agent is then a measurable function σ : T × P → ∆(K), and, clearly, σ is an
optimal strategy if and only if it is a selection of Λ.
We now turn to the principals’ problem. Principals choose simultaneously. For
all i ∈ I, principal i’s choice set is ∆(Pi), the set of mixed strategies on Pi, and his
payoff function is denoted by pii : T × P ×K→ R. We assume:
Assumption 6 pii is an integrably bounded Carathe´odory function, i.e., t 7→ pii(t, C, k)
is measurable for all (C, k) ∈ P ×K, (C, k) 7→ pii(t, C, k) is continuous for all t ∈ T ,
and there exists an integrable function bi : T → R such that |pii(t, C, k)| ≤ bi(t) for all
(t, C, k) ∈ T × P ×K.
Note that in the above formalization we allow each principal’s payoff to depend on
the type t of the agent, on the choice k of the agent and also on the contracts C that
he and the other principals have offered. A possible justification for the dependence
of a principal’s payoff on the contracts being offered include the cost of writing each
contract (so the payoff of principal i decreases with the cardinality of Ci). It is
important to note that the delegation principle of Martimort and Stole (2002) and
Page and Monteiro (2003) extends to this more general framework, as can be easily
verified, implying that menu games are still appropriate for analyzing common agency
problems in which such dependence holds.
If the principals offer a menu C = (C1, . . . , Cm) ∈ P and the agent uses a strategy
σ : T × P → ∆(K), then principal i’s payoff is
Fi(t, C;σ) =
∫
K
pii(t, C, k)dσ(k|t, C). (5)
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Since σ is measurable, then so is the real-valued function Fi on T × P . Finally, if
principals choose strategies α = (α1, . . . , αm) and the agent chooses a strategy σ,
Fi(α; σ) =
∫
P
∫
T
Fi(t, C; σ)dµ(t)dα(C) (6)
denotes principal i’s payoff.
A menu game is then described by G = (I, (Ki, pii)i∈I ,K, T, µ, v, ϕ). Furthermore,
we use GPM , GMS and GH to denote particular menu games for the corresponding
choices of K and ϕ mentioned above.
As in Martimort and Stole (2002), we consider the subgame perfect equilibria
(SPE) of a menu game G. A strategy (α, σ) is a SPE of a menu game G if and only
if
1. σ is a measurable selection of Λ and
2. Fi(α;σ) ≥ Fi(α′i, α−i;σ) for all i ∈ I and α′i ∈ ∆(Pi).
Thus, in a SPE of G, the agent optimizes for all possible types and menus offered, and
each principal optimizes given the strategy of the other principals and the strategy
of the agent.
Equivalently, we can describe a SPE in the following way: a strategy (α, σ) is
a SPE if σ is an optimal strategy for the agent and α is a Nash equilibrium of the
(possibly discontinuous) normal-form game (Pi, Fi(·;σ))i∈I induced by σ.
3 Existence of Equilibrium
Our main result is the following existence theorem.
Theorem 1 A SPE exists for all menu games G satisfying assumptions 1 – 6.
Since the frameworks of Page and Monteiro (2003) and Martimort and Stole (2002)
are particular cases of ours, we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1 All menu games GH , GPM and GMS satisfying assumptions 1 – 6 have
a SPE.
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In order to establish Theorem 1 we first generalize the theorem in Simon and
Zame (1990) by allowing the payoff correspondence to depend on the agent’s type.
We then use this result to prove the existence of a subgame perfect equilibrium in
any continuous menu game. This last argument uses Lemma 2, below, which shows
how to obtain a subgame perfect equilibrium from a solution of a (generalized) game
with an endogenous sharing rule.
3.1 A Generalization of Simon and Zame’s Theorem
A generalized game with an endogenous sharing rule is an m + 3-tuple
G = (P1, . . . , Pm, T, µ,Q) where Pi is a compact metric space for all i, T is a
Polish space, µ is a measure defined on the Borel measurable subsets of T and
Q : T × P ⇒ Rm is measurable, integrably bounded (i.e., there exists a µ-integrable
function b : T → R such that ||u|| ≤ b(t) for all u ∈ Q(t, C) and for all (t, C) ∈ T×C),
has nonempty, convex and compact values and is upper hemi-continuous in C for all
t ∈ T (i.e., C 7→ Q(t, C) is upper hemi-continuous for all t ∈ T ).
A solution for G is a pair (q, α) such that q is a measurable selection of Q,7
αi ∈ ∆(Pi) and∫
P
∫
T
qi(t, C)dµ(t)dα(C) ≥
∫
P
∫
T
qi(t, C)dµ(t)d(βi × α−i)(C) (7)
for all i and all βi ∈ ∆(Pi).
Theorem 2 A solution exists for all generalized games with an endogenous sharing
rule.
The proof of Theorem 2 follows closely the one in Simon and Zame (1990) and is
presented in Appendix A.1.
7A function q : T×P → Rm is a measurable selection of Q if q is measurable and q(t, C) ∈ Q(t, C)
for all (t, C) ∈ T × P .
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3.2 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 proceeds as follows: first, we define a generalized game
with an endogenous sharing rule, essentially, defining the payoff correspondence by
composing principals’ payoff functions with the optimal choice correspondence of the
agent. We then use Theorem 2 to obtain a solution to that generalized game with
an endogenous sharing rule. Then, we use Lemma 2 to show that the measurable
selection from the payoff correspondence can be written as the composition between
the principals’ payoff function and a measurable selection from the agent’s optimal
choice correspondence (i.e., an optimal strategy for the agent). Finally, we show that
this strategy together with the principals’ strategies that are part of the solution
for the generalized game with an endogenous sharing rule form a subgame perfect
equilibrium strategy.
Let h : T × P ×∆(K)→ Rm be defined by
h(t, C, λ) =
∫
K
pi(t, C, k)dλ(k). (8)
Note that if σ : T × P → ∆(K) is a strategy for the agent, then F (t, C; σ) =
h(t, C, σ(t, C)) for all t ∈ T and C ∈ P . Also, note that (C, λ) 7→ h(t, C, λ) is
continuous and t 7→ h(t, C, λ) is measurable. Hence, by Aliprantis and Border (1999,
Lemma 4.50, p. 151), h is (jointly) measurable since P ×∆(K) is a compact metric
space.
Furthermore, letting S = T × P , h : S ×∆(K) → R is measurable in s = (t, C)
and continuous in λ, and so a Carathe´odory function (although h satisfies additional
properties, this suffices to prove Theorem 1). Define Q : T × P ⇒ Rm by
Q(t, C) = {h(t, C, λ) : λ ∈ Λ(t, C)}. (9)
Lemma 1 The correspondence Λ is measurable and has compact values. The corre-
spondence Q is measurable, integrably bounded, upper hemi-continuous in C for all
t ∈ T and has nonempty, convex and compact values.
It follows by Lemma 1 that G = (P1, . . . , Pm, T, µ,Q) is a generalized game with
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an endogenous sharing rule. Hence, by Theorem 2, there exists a solution (q, α) for
G.
In order to obtain a subgame perfect equilibrium from the solution (q, α), we use
the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Let S be a measurable space, X be a compact metric space, g : S ×
X → Rm a Carathe´odory function and Θ : S ⇒ X a compact valued, measurable
correspondence.
If Q : S ⇒ Rm is defined by
Q(s) = {g(s, x) : x ∈ Θ(s)} (10)
for all s ∈ S and q is a measurable selection of Q, then there exists a measurable
selection α of Θ such that q(s) = g(s, α(s)) for all s ∈ S.
This Lemma follows from Furukawa (1972, Lemma 4.6) and Aliprantis and Border
(1999, Theorem 17.10, p. 565) .
Since T × P is a measurable space, ∆(K) is a compact metric space and Λ is
compact valued and measurable, then by Lemma 2, there exists a measurable selection
σ from Λ such that q(t, C) = h(t, C, σ(t, C)) for all t ∈ T and C ∈ P . Hence,
Fi(α;σ) =
∫
P
∫
T
hi(t, C, σ(t, C))dµ(t)dα(C) =∫
P
∫
T
qi(t, C)dµ(t)dα(C) ≥
∫
P
∫
T
qi(t, C)dµ(t)d(βi × α−i)(C) =∫
P
∫
T
hi(t, C, σ(t, C))dµ(t)d(βi × α−i)(C) = Fi(βi, α−i;σ)
(11)
for all i and all βi ∈ ∆(Pi). It then follows that (α, σ) is a SPE of G.
3.3 Two Examples
In this subsection, we derive from Theorem 1 a general existence result for the retail
market and lobby models of Martimort and Stole (2003) and Martimort and Semenov
(2006), respectively.
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3.3.1 Retail Market Game
In this subsection, we consider a generalized version of Martimort and Stole (2003).
The principals are thought to be retailers that sell perfect substitutes in a final market,
while the agent is the single supplier of the intermediate goods needed to produce the
final good.
Assume that there are l intermediate goods and let the contract space be a compact
subsetK of Rl+1 with the following interpretation: the contract (y, d), with y ∈ Rl and
d ∈ R specifies that the agent must produce the vector of quantities y = (y1, . . . , yl)
of the l intermediate goods, receiving d dollars in compensation.
Assume that there are m principals with Ki = K for all i = 2, . . . ,m, K1 =
{kn, kc} with kn 6= kc and let K = KMS. The choice of kc ∈ K1 is interpreted as the
decision to contract by the agent, while kn means that the agent does not contract
with any principal. Thus, we are considering the intrinsic common agency problem.
Also, if k ∈ K, then k = (k1, . . . , km) and ki = (yi, di) for all i ≥ 2.
Let Y be the projection of K onto the first l coordinates. Principal i, i ≥ 2,
uses the l intermediate goods to produce p final goods according to the continuous
production function gi : Y → Rp. Let X =
∑m
i=2 gi(Y ) and let P : X → Rp be
the continuous inverse demand function of the p final goods. Principals’ payoffs are
defined by
pi1(t, C, k) =
 1 if C1 = K1 = {kn, kc},0 if otherwise. (12)
And for i ≥ 2:
pii(t, C, k) =
 P
(∑m
j=2 gi(yi)
)
· gi(yi)− di if k1 = kc,
0 if k1 = kn.
(13)
The agent’s technology is described by an integrably bounded Carathe´odory cost
function c : T × Y → R and her utility function is
v(t, k) =

∑m
i=2 di − g (t,
∑m
i=2 yi) if k1 = kc,
0 if k1 = kn.
(14)
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Therefore, we allow for multi-goods, in both the final and the intermediate markets
and more general cost/production functions, which, in particular, do not have to be
differentiable. Despite these generalizations, it follows from Theorem 1 that this
model has a SPE.
3.3.2 Lobbying Game
Consider m lobbying groups (principals) that want to influence a decision-maker
(agent), who chooses a policy variable q ∈ Kq where Kq is a compact subset of RL.
The variable q can be interpreted as a level of vector of L public goods, a vector of
L regulated prices, etc. Each principal chooses a vector of contributions θ ∈ Kθ, a
compact subset of RL+.
We first consider the case where the principals make contributions for each of the
L policy variables. A contract is then a pair (q, θ) ∈ Kq × Kθ: for all l = 1, . . . , L,
if the agent chooses policy ql, then the principal pays contribution θl. Thus, the
contract space for principal i is Ki = Kq ×Kθ for all i.
Let J be the set of all subsets of {1, 2, . . . ,m} (not necessarily nonempty). The
pure action space of the agent is K = Kq ×Kmθ × J L with the following interpreta-
tion: if the agent chooses (q, θ, J) = (q, θ1, . . . , θm, J1, . . . , JL), it means that she will
implement policy q and, for all l = 1, . . . , L, accept contributions θi,l for all i ∈ Jl.
However, the agent can only accept contributions corresponding to the policy level
she chooses. This is used to define her constraint correspondence ϕ : T × P ⇒ ∆(K)
as follows: for all l = 1, . . . , L, let projl : RL → R denote the projection onto the lth
coordinate and define
ϕ(t, C) ={λ ∈ ∆(K) : λ({(q, θ, J) ∈ K : for all l = 1, . . . , L,
(ql, θi,l) ∈ projl(Ci) for all i ∈ Jl}) = 1}.
(15)
The agent’s utility function is v : T ×K→ R defined by:
v(t, q, θ, J) = V
(
L∑
l=1
∑
i∈Jl
θi,l − C(t, q)
)
, (16)
where C : T ×Kq → R is a continuous cost function, interpreted as an opportunity
cost and V : R→ R is the agent’s continuous money utility function.
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For each i = 1, . . . ,m, principal i’s payoff function pii : T ×K→ R is given by
pii(t, q, θ, J) = Ui
(
Ri(t, q)−
∑
l:i∈Jl
θi,l
)
, (17)
where the continuous function Ri : T ×Kq → R captures the benefit he obtains from
policy q and Ui is his continuous money utility function.
Finally, we consider the case where principals make a contribution for a global
policy. In this case, Kθ is a compact subset of R+. The contract space is still
Ki = Kq × Kθ, with the interpretation that if the agent chooses q ∈ Kq, then the
principal pays θ ∈ Kθ. Since the agent can no longer accept a contribution for each
policy variable, we let K = Kq ×Kmθ × J .
The agent’s constraint correspondence is
ϕ(t, C) = {λ ∈ ∆(K) : λ({(q, θ, J) ∈ K : (q, θi) ∈ Ci for all i ∈ J}) = 1} (18)
and her utility function is
v(t, q, θ, J) = V
(∑
i∈J
θi − C(t, q)
)
. (19)
Finally, principal i’s payoff function is
pii(t, q, θ, J) =
 Ui (Ri(t, q)− θi) if i ∈ J,Ui(0) if i ∈ J c. (20)
It follows from Theorem 1 that this game has a SPE. It is worth noting that
this model is a generalized version of a model suggested by Martimort and Semenov
(2006). This is the case since we allow for many policy variables, more than two
principals, risk aversion and more general payoff functions.
4 Conclusions
We have shown that a SPE exists in all menu games. Compared with the results
of Page and Monteiro (2003) and Monteiro and Page (2008a), our existence theorem
has the advantage of allowing for a richer economic model, dispensing, in particular,
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with the exclusivity and the no-fixed-cost assumptions made in those papers. Our
approach relies heavily on the ideas of Simon and Zame (1990). In fact, the proof of
our existence result is straightforward once we extend their theorem to the case in
which the principals’ payoff correspondence depends on the agent’s type.
A Appendix
In the appendix, we prove Theorem 2, and Lemmas 1 and 2. Also, we prove that the
correspondences ϕPM , ϕMS and ϕH are continuous with nonempty, convex, compact
values.
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2
We start to note that we may assume that Q is bounded.8 In fact, let b : T → R be
such that ||u|| = max1≤i≤m |ui| ≤ b(t) for all u = (u1, . . . , um) ∈ Q(t, C) and (t, C) ∈
T×P and define, for each t ∈ T , γ(t) = 1+b(t). Transform the payoff correspondence
Q by defining Q˜(t, C) = {u˜ ∈ Rm : γ(t)u˜ ∈ Q(t, C)} for all (t, C) ∈ T × P . The
correspondence Q˜ is bounded: for all (t, C) ∈ T × P and u˜ ∈ Q˜(t, C),
||u˜|| ≤
m∑
i=1
|u˜i| =
m∑
i=1
|γ(t)u˜i|
γ(t)
≤
m∑
i=1
γ(t)
γ(t)
= m. (21)
Furthermore, Q˜ inherits all the other properties of Q. Transform the measure µ by
defining A =
[∫
T
γ(t)dµ(t)
]−1
> 0 and µ˜(B) = A
∫
B
γ(t)dµ(t) for all measurable
subset B of T . We then obtain that, for any measurable selection q˜ of Q˜ and any
C ∈ P , ∫
T
q˜i(t, C)dµ˜(t) =
∫
T
qi(t, C)
γ(t)
Aγ(t)dµ(t) = A
∫
T
qi(t, C)dµ(t), (22)
where q(t, C) = γ(t)q˜(t, C) ∈ Q(t, C) for all (t, C) ∈ T × P . Therefore, if (q˜, α) is a
solution of the transformed game G˜ = (P1, . . . , Pm, T, µ˜, Q˜), then (q, α) is a solution
of the original game G, where q(t, C) = γ(t)q˜(t, C) for all (t, C) ∈ T × P .
8We are thankful to an associate editor and an anonymous referee for suggesting to us this
argument.
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As a consequence of the above argument, we may assume that Q is bounded.
We note that, in this case, we may assume that there exists w,W > 0 such that
w ≤ ui ≤ W for all i = 1, . . . ,m, u = (u1, . . . , um) ∈ Q(t, C) and (t, C) ∈ T × P . In
fact, if B ∈ R is such that ||u|| = max1≤i≤m |ui| ≤ B for all u = (u1, . . . , um) ∈ Q(t, C)
and (t, C) ∈ T × P , define Qˆ(t, C) = Q(t, C) + (B, . . . , B) + w = {uˆ ∈ Rm : uˆ =
u+(B+w, . . . , B+w), u ∈ Q(t, C)} for all (t, C) ∈ T ×P . Letting W = w+2B, we
obtain that w ≤ ui ≤ W for all i and all u ∈ Qˆ(t, C) and Gˆ = (P1, . . . , Pm, T, µ, Qˆ)
is a generalized game with an endogenous sharing rule. Furthermore, it is easy to
see that if (qˆ, α) is a solution for Gˆ and q : T × P → Rm is defined by q(t, C) =
qˆ(t, C)− (B + w, . . . , B + w) for all (t, C) ∈ T × P , then (q, α) is a solution for G.
Due to the above, we assume from now on that there exists w,W > 0 such that
w ≤ ui ≤ W for all i = 1, . . . ,m, u = (u1, . . . , um) ∈ Q(t, C) and (t, C) ∈ T × P .
Our proof of Theorem 2 from now on follows the one in Simon and Zame (1990).
Indeed, we start by modifying their Lemma 2 and then proceed by adapting the six
steps of their proof to our setting.
Both their Lemma 2 and our version of it applies to vector-valued measures defined
as follows. If S is a Polish space, ψ is a probability measure on S, and q is a
measurable, ψ-integrably bounded function from S into Rm, define qψ ∈ ∆(S) by
qψ(B) =
∫
B
qdψ (23)
for all measurable subsets B of S.
A particular case is when S = T × P and ψ = µ × α for some α ∈ ∆(P ). In
this case, let q : T × P → Rm be µ-integrably bounded and measurable and define
qˆ : P → Rm by
qˆ(C) =
∫
T
q(t, C)dµ(t). (24)
The following lemma considers the above special case and establishes a property
of q(µ × α) that is useful in our version of Simon and Zame’s Lemma 2. It uses the
following notation: if X and Y are metric spaces and ν is a measure on X × Y , νY
denotes the marginal distribution of ν on Y .
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Lemma 3 If q : T × P → Rm is bounded and measurable, then qˆ is measurable and
qˆα = q(µ× α)P . (25)
Proof. Since q is bounded and measurable, the integral exists. The measurability
of qˆ follows from Fubini’s Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 11.26,
p. 411)).
We turn to the second claim. Let B be a measurable subset of P . It follows that
qˆα(B) =
∫
B
qˆdα =
∫
B
∫
T
qdµdα =∫
T×B
qd(µ× α) = q(µ× α)(T ×B) = q(µ× α)P (B).
(26)
Thus, the lemma follows.
After these preliminaries, we turn to our version of Lemma 2 in Simon and Zame
(1990). There, we allow for the case where S is the product of a Polish space (i.e., a
complete separable metric space) and a compact metric space and Q is measurable
but only upper hemi-continuous in the second variable. However, we assume that all
the measures involved are finite. Recall that a vector measure on a metric space X
is a countably additive set function τ from the Borel σ-algebra of X into a Banach
space Y . A sequence of vector measures {τn}n converge weakly to a vector measure
τ if
∫
X
fdτ = limn
∫
X
fdτn for all bounded, continuous functions f : X → Y .9
Lemma 4 Let {νn} be a sequence of probability measures on P converging weakly to
ν and let Q : T × P ⇒ Rm be a bounded, measurable correspondence, upper hemi-
continuous in C for all t ∈ T and with compact, convex, nonempty values. For each
n, let qn be a measurable selection from Q.
If the sequence {qn(µ×νn)} of vector-valued measures converges weakly to a vector-
valued measure ξ, then there exists a measurable selection q from Q such that ξ =
q(µ× ν).
9See Diestel and Uhl (1977) for more details about vector measures and Ma¨rz and Shorrt (1994)
for weak convergence of vector measures.
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Proof. Note that {µ × νn} converges weakly to {µ × ν} by Hildenbrand (1974,
Theorem 27, pg. 49). Therefore, the boundedness of Q implies, as in Simon and
Zame (1990, Lemma 2), that there exists a measurable function q : T ×P → Rm such
that ξ = q(µ× ν).
Let H = {(t, C) ∈ T ×P : q(t, C) 6∈ Q(t, C)}. Since both q and Q are measurable,
then H is measurable. In fact, let S = T × P for convenience, f = (idS, q) and δ :
S×Rm → R be defined by δ(s, x) = maxz∈Q(s) ||x−z||. Clearly, f is measurable since
q is also measurable. Since Q is measurable, then Q is weakly measurable by Theorem
17.2 in Aliprantis and Border (1999, p. 559). Then, δ is a Carathe´odory function by
Theorem 17.5 in Aliprantis and Border (1999, p. 562) and thus measurable since Rm
is separable (see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Lemma 4.50, p.151)). It follows that the
function g : S → R defined by g = δ◦f is measurable and thatH = {s ∈ S : g(s) > 0}
is a measurable subset of S.
In order to show that q(t, C) ∈ Q(t, C) µ × ν-a.e., consider the following. Let
t ∈ T and Ht = {C ∈ P : (t, C) ∈ H}. Since H is a measurable subset of T × P ,
then Ht is a measurable subset of P (see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Lemma 4.45,
p. 148)). Since P is compact and c 7→ Q(t, c) is upper hemi-continuous, it follows by
the arguments of Simon and Zame that ν(Ht) = 0. Thus,
µ× ν(H) =
∫
T
ν(Ht)dµ(t) = 0 (27)
by Fubini’s Theorem. This completes the proof since we can correct q in H, obtaining
a function that is still measurable.
We turn to the proof of Theorem 2, showing that the same arguments used by
Simon and Zame extend to our setting, with minor changes.
Recall that w,W > 0 is such that w ≤ ui ≤ W for all i = 1, . . . ,m, u =
(u1, . . . , um) ∈ Q(t, C) and (t, C) ∈ T × P .
Step 1: Finite approximations. Let g be a measurable selection from Q.
Recall that P is a compact metric space. As in Simon and Zame (1990), discretize P in
order to obtain, for all r ∈ N, a finite action space P ri for all players i = 1, . . . ,m and a
19
Nash equilibrium (αr1, . . . , α
r
m) for the normal-form game G
r = (P r1 , . . . , P
r
m, gˆ) (recall
that gˆ is defined by gˆ(C) =
∫
T
g(t, C)dµ(t) for all C ∈ P ). Let αr = αr1×· · ·×αrm.
Step 2: Limits. Since ∆(Pi) is compact, then we may assume that {αri}r
converges for all i = 1, . . . ,m. Thus, {αr}r converges. Letting α = limr αr, it follows
that {µ× αr}r converges to µ× α.
We claim that {g(µ×αr)}r has a convergent subsequence. Since g = (g1, . . . , gm),
it suffices to show that {gi(µ×αr)}r has a convergent subsequence for all i = 1, . . . ,m.
Let i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. For all r ∈ N, define γr = ∫
T×P gidµ × αr ≥ w. Since
gi(t, C) ≤ W for all (t, C) ∈ T × P , then γr ≤ W . Hence, {γr}r is bounded and we
may assume that it converges. Let γ = limr γ
r ∈ [w,W ].
For all r ∈ N, define g˘ri : T × P → R by g˘ri (t, C) = qi(t, C)/γr. Then, g˘ri (µ× αr)
is a probability measure on T ×P . Furthermore, the sequence {g˘ri (µ×αr)}r is tight.
Indeed, let ε > 0 and let M > 0 be such that g˘ri (t, C) ≤ M for all (t, C) ∈ T × P
and r ∈ R (the existence of M follows because both gi and {γr}r are bounded).
Furthermore, let K be a compact subset of T such that µ(Kc) < ε/M (note that µ
is tight by Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 10.7, p. 370)). Then, K × P is a
compact subset of T × P and
g˘ri (µ× αr)((K × P )c) = g˘ri (µ× αr)(Kc × P ) ≤Mµ(Kc) < ε, (28)
establishing that {g˘ri (µ × αr)}r is tight. Therefore, it has a convergent subsequence
(see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 14.22, p. 488)).
For convenience, assume that {g˘ri (µ×αr)}r converges and let ν˘ = limr g˘ri (µ×αr).
Finally, define ν = γν˘. We claim that ν = limr gi(µ×αr). In order to prove this claim,
let f : T×P → R be continuous and bounded. It follows that ∫
T×P fdν = γ
∫
T×P fdν˘
for all r ∈ R (by the definition of ν), ∫
T×P fdν˘ = limr
∫
T×P f q˘
r
i d(µ × αr) (since
ν˘ = limr g˘
r
i (µ× αr)) and so∫
T×P
fd(gi(µ× αr)) =
∫
T×P
fgid(µ× αr) =
γr
∫
T×P
fg˘ri d(µ× αr)→ γ
∫
T×P
fdν˘ =
∫
T×P
fdν.
(29)
Hence, ν = limr gi(µ× αr).
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We have, therefore, established that, taking a subsequence if necessary, we may
assume that {g(µ× αr)}r converges. Let ξ = limr g(µ× αr).
Step 3: Selections. By Lemma 4, there exists a measurable selection q from
Q such that ξ = q(µ× α).
Step 4: Better responses. Recall that hˆ : P → Rm is defined by hˆ(C) =∫
T
h(t, C)dµ(t) for all µ-integrably bounded and measurable functions h : T × P →
Rm.
By Lemma 3, qˆ is measurable and αr is a Nash equilibrium of the normal-form
game (P r1 , . . . , P
r
m, gˆ) for all r ∈ N. Since {g(µ × αr)} converges to q(µ × α), qˆα =
q(µ × α)P and, similarly, gˆαr = g(µ × αr)P for all r ∈ R, it follows that {gˆαr}
converges to qˆα.
If X is a metric space and x ∈ X, let δx denote the probability measure on X
degenerate on x. Letting
Hi =
{
Ci ∈ Pi :
∫
P
∫
T
qidµd(δCi × α−i) >
∫
P
∫
T
qidµd(αi × α−i)
}
, (30)
it follows from Simon and Zame (1990, Step 4) that
αi(Hi) = αi
({
xi ∈ Pi :
∫
P
qˆid(δCi × α−i) >
∫
P
qˆid(αi × α−i)
})
= 0. (31)
Step 5: Perturbation. As in Step 5 of Simon and Zame (1990), for all i,
let pi : T × P → Rm be any measurable selection from Q which minimizes the
ith component. Let Y = {C ∈ P : Ci ∈ Hi for at least two indices i} and define
f : T × P → Rm as follows:
f(t, C) =
 pi(t, C) if C ∈ Hi × P−i but C 6∈ Y,q(t, C) otherwise. (32)
Since α(Hi × P−i) = 0 for all i ∈ I, then∫
P
∫
T
fdµdα =
∫
P\∪mi=1(Hi×P−i)
∫
T
qdµdα =
∫
P
∫
T
qdµdα. (33)
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Therefore, ∫
P
fˆdα =
∫
P
qˆdα. (34)
Let i ∈ I. If Ci 6∈ Hi, then
qˆi(C) = fˆi(C) (35)
except possibly for C ∈ [{Ci} × P−i] ∩ [∪j 6=i(Hj × P−j)]. Finally, we also have that
pˆii(C) = fˆi(C) (36)
for all C ∈ Hi × P−i and C 6∈ Y .
Step 6: Solution. Note that pii : T×P → R is lower semi-continuous in C for all
t ∈ T , as in Simon and Zame (1990, step 6). Thus, it follows from Fatou’s Lemma (see
Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 11.19, p. 407)) that pˆii : P → R is lower semi-
continuous. Because of equations (34), (35) and (36), it follows from Simon and Zame
(1990, Step 6) that α is a Nash equilibrium of the normal-form game (P1, . . . , Pm, fˆ).
Since fˆ =
∫
T
fdµ, it follows that (f, α) is a solution of G = (P1, . . . , Pm, T, µ,Q).
This completes the proof of Theorem 2.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
For convenience, let S = T × P . Note first that Λ is measurable by Theorem 17.18
in Aliprantis and Border (1999, p. 570) and has nonempty, convex and compact
values. Furthermore, by Berge’s Maximum Theorem (see Berge (1997, p. 116)), the
correspondence C 7→ Λ(t, C) is upper hemi-continuous for all t ∈ T .
Then, Q is integrably bounded since pi is integrably bounded and Q is nonempty
valued since Λ is also nonempty valued. Since for all s ∈ S, Λ(s) is compact, Q(s) =
h(s,Λ(s)) and λ 7→ h(s, λ) is continuous, then Q(s) is compact. Thus, Q is compact
valued.
Since Λ is convex valued, then Q is convex valued as well. Indeed, if s ∈ S,
x1, x2 ∈ Q(s) and a ∈ (0, 1), then there exists λl ∈ Λ(s) such that xl = h(s, λl) for all
l = 1, 2. Then, aλ1 + (1 − a)λ2 ∈ Λ(s) and ax1 + (1 − a)x2 = h(s, aλ1 + (1 − a)λ2)
imply that ax1 + (1− a)x2 ∈ Q(s).
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Since C 7→ Λ(t, C) is upper hemi-continuous and (C, λ) 7→ h(t, C, λ) is continuous
for all t ∈ T , then C 7→ Q(t, C) is upper hemi-continuous.
Finally, we show that Q is measurable. Define Ξ : S ⇒ S × ∆(K) by Ξ(s) =
{(s, λ) : λ ∈ Λ(s)}.
We claim that Ξ is measurable. Since Ξ is compact valued, then it is enough to
show that Ξ is weakly measurable (see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Lemma 17.2,
p. 559)). Let A and B be measurable subsets of S and ∆(K), respectively. Then,
Ξ`(A × B) = {s ∈ S : Ξ(s) ∩ (A × B) 6= ∅} = A ∩ Λ`(B) is measurable since Λ
is measurable. Therefore, if V = ∪∞k=1(Ak × Bk) and Ak and Bk are measurable
subsets of S and ∆(K), respectively, for all k ∈ N, then Ξ`(V ) = ∪∞k=1Ξ`(Ak ×Bk) is
measurable. Therefore, if V is an open subset of S×∆(K), then there exist sequences
{Ak} and {Bk} of open subsets of S and ∆(K) such that V = ∪∞k=1(Ak × Bk) since
both S and ∆(K) are second countable. Thus, Ξ`(V ) is measurable and so Ξ is weakly
measurable.
Since Ξ is measurable, then Q is measurable as well. In fact, let B be a measurable
subset of Rm. Then, h−1(B) is a measurable subset of S × ∆(K) and so Q`(B) =
{s ∈ S : Ξ(s) ∩ h−1(B) 6= ∅} = Ξ`(h−1(B)) is measurable. This completes the proof
of Lemma 1.
A.3 Properties of ϕ
In this appendix, we establish the properties of the agent’s constraint correspondences
ϕPM , ϕMS and ϕH . In all these cases, the result is a consequence of the following
Lemma.
Lemma 5 If φ : P ⇒ K is continuous with nonempty compact values, then ϕ :
T × P ⇒ ∆(K) defined by
ϕ(t, C) = {λ ∈ ∆(K) : λ(φ(C)) = 1} (37)
is continuous and has nonempty, convex, compact values.
Proof. It follows from Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 16.14, p. 530) that
ϕ is upper hemi-continuous with nonempty, compact, convex values.
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We claim that ϕ is also lower hemi-continuous. In order to prove this claim,
let {tn}∞n=1 be a convergent sequence in T , {Cn}∞n=1 be a convergent sequence in
P , t = limn tn, C = limnCn and λ ∈ ϕ(t, C). We need to prove that there exists a
subsequence {nj}∞j=1 of indexes and elements λnj ∈ ϕ(tnj , Cnj) such that λnj converges
to λ.
By Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 16.16, p. 531), the function Φ from P
into the space of all nonempty, compact subsets of K endowed with the Hausdorff
metric defined by Φ(C) = φ(C) is continuous. Thus, letting dH denote the Hausdorff
metric, it follows that dH(φ(Cn), φ(C)) converges to zero.
For all j ∈ N, let nj ∈ N be such that dH(φ(Cnj), φ(C)) < 1/j. Let j be fixed.
Since dH(φ(Cnj), φ(C)) < 1/j, then φ(C) ⊆ ∪k∈φ(Cnj )B1/j(k). Since φ(C) is a com-
pact subset of K, there exists {k1, . . . , kM} ⊆ φ(Cnj) such that φ(C) ⊆ ∪Mm=1B1/j(km).
Finally, define B1 = B1/j(k1), Bm = B1/j(km) \ ∪m−1l=1 Bl for all m = 2, . . . ,M , and
λnj by setting λnj(km) = λ(Bm) for all m = 1, . . . ,M .
Since λ(φ(C)) = 1, then λnj(φ(Cnj)) = 1 and, arguing as in the proof of Parthasarathy
(1967, Theorem II.6.3), it follows that λnj converges to λ. Therefore, ϕ is lower hemi-
continuous.
As a consequence, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 2 The correspondences ϕPM , ϕMS and ϕH are continuous with nonempty,
convex, compact values.
Proof. In the case of ϕMS, simply define φMS : P ⇒ KMS by φMS(C) = C.
Clearly, φMS is continuous and has nonempty compact values.
In the case ϕPM , we define for all i ∈ I, φi : P ⇒ KPM by φi(C) = {i} × Ci
and φPM : P ⇒ KPM by φPM(C) = ∪mi=1φi(C). Clearly, φPM has nonempty and
compact values and φi is continuous for all i ∈ I. Since the finite union of continuous
correspondences is continuous (see Aliprantis and Border (1999, Theorem 16.27, p.
537)), φPM is continuous.
In the hybrid case, we define for all i ∈ I, φi : P ⇒ KH by, φi(C) = {i} × Ci,
then, for each n define φn(C) = ∪i∈Inφi(C), where {In}Nn=1 is a finite partition of I, it
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is easy to see that φn has nonempty and compact values and φn is continuous for all
n. Finally, define φH : P ⇒ KH by φH(C) =
∏N
n=1 φn(C). Since the finite product
of continuous correspondences with compact values is continuous (see Aliprantis and
Border (1999, Theorem 16.28, p. 537)), φH is continuous and has nonempty and
compact values as well.
In all cases the conclusion follows from Lemma 5.
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